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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA-ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSCS DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 093327

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/15
TAGS: [OSCE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KCFE](#)
SUBJECT: FSC FALL 2009 OPENING OF ROUND GUIDANCE

REF: USOSCE 00182

Classified by: Donna A. Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Offic...

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Cyber Security
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22.(SBU) Cyber security has gained significant traction in the OSCE and Washington expects FSC delegations to push for a deliverable on this issue for the Athens Ministerial in December. U.S. reps at the March 2009 workshop on cyber security steered discussions as much as possible toward defense, mitigation, remedial measures, and reducing vulnerabilities, noting that the same defensive strategies are required regardless of the source of an attack. U.S. policy remains that hackers and cyber criminals, not states, are the most urgent

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cyber threat. USDel should continue to oppose Russian arguments for arms control-like constraints on information technology and offensive capabilities. USDel should continue to stress that the most value can come from exchanges on defensive measures and/or strategies, mitigation, and remediation.

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